Vulnerability and Protection in Research: Is It Ethical to Use Prisoners as Research Subjects? by Straus, Sarah A.






















Vulnerability and Protection in Research: Is it Ethical to use Prisoners as Research 
Subjects? 



























This paper reviews the basis for and the literature pertaining to the ethical issues 
surrounding the use of the vulnerable population of prisoners as subjects for research 
protocols. The foundation for the development of ethical guidelines to protect this 
population comes from the exploitation of vulnerable populations including prisoners in 
the Holocaust, totalitarian regimes, and even in countries with long histories of 
democracy. The main ethical issues relevant to research with prisoners are respect for 
persons, justice, and the theory of Utilitarianism. Within the ethical guidelines there is a 
conflict between protecting prisoners from exploitation in research and prisoners right to 
participate in research. Therefore, many ethical codes attempt to safeguard this especially 
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Background 
 
Within medical research and healthcare certain groups are offered special 
protections and services because they are considered “vulnerable” (Ruof, 411). 
Vulnerable populations include but are not limited to prisoners, women who are pregnant, 
children, and minorities. The CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research define “vulnerable persons” as “those who are relatively (or absolutely) 
incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient 
power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect 
their own interests” (Macklin, 474).  Therefore, there are specific guidelines designed to 
protect the rights and welfare of vulnerable persons by requiring special justifications for 
involving vulnerable individuals in research. In medical research and healthcare, 
“vulnerability” is a vague concept that has substantial effects both for those labeled 
vulnerable and for those not. It is essential for policy makers, healthcare workers, and 
researchers to properly identify vulnerable subjects in order for resources to be allocated 
appropriately and in order to ensure that those who are entitled to special protections and 
socialized benefits are afforded these protections and benefits (Ruof, 412). There has 
been a struggle to define vulnerability, and this has led to arguments about its value as a 
qualifying factor in the allocation of health resources and its appropriateness as a guiding 
principle in bioethics.  
 
History  
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The exploitation inherent in the use of human research subjects in recent history 
highlighted the need for a code of ethics protecting human research subjects.  In Nazi 
Germany, the Imperial Japanese Army in Asia, totalitarian regimes, and even in countries 
with a long tradition of democracy wealthy or powerful individuals or agencies took 
“advantage of the poverty, powerlessness, or dependency of others by using the latter to 
serve their own needs (those of the wealthy and powerful) without adequate 
compensating benefits for the less powerful or disadvantaged individuals or groups” 
(Macklin, 475).  
In the first third of the 20th century there was a significant increase in popularity 
of theories based on eugenics. As a consequence of this pseudoscience, the Nazi 
government introduced a policy of “racial hygiene,” which had harmful political, social, 
and scientific consequences. Rooted in the Darwinist concept of natural selection, the aim 
of this policy was to enhance the reproductive rate of the “Aryan race.” Prominent 
scientists and geneticists promoted eugenics and this “racial science,” thereby 
medicalizing racism and anti-Semitism (Lopez-Munoz 794).  
When Adolf Hitler came to power he implemented a series of laws promoting 
racial segregation and the protection of the “superior race.” These laws were created in 
collaboration with part of the German medical community. One of the first laws enacted 
was called the Sterilization Act, which enforced the sterilization of subjects with certain 
medical and mental diagnoses in order to remove a complete generation of subjects with 
genetic deficiencies to purify the gene pool and thereby improve the “German race.” The 
scientists involved in implementing these laws justified their actions, arguing that they 
were performing these procedures “for the benefit of the nation and the health of 
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subsequent generations, and not for the individual patient.” They believed they were part 
of a “holy mission” to benefit society as a whole (Lopez-Munoz 795).  
In addition to the Sterilization Act, the German medical community was involved 
in implementing the Nuremberg Laws, which were enacted for the purpose of 
“purification of the blood of the German people.” The medical communities involvement 
in implementing these laws demonstrates the relaxation of ethical principles. In addition 
to prohibiting the marriage between Jews and Aryans, these laws required that couples 
undergo premarital medical examinations in order to prevent the spread of “racially 
damaging diseases.” In addition, as the war was approaching the Germans needed to free 
up hospital beds for wounded soldiers, and thus, medical professionals were instructed to 
implement ‘euthanasic death” to incurable patients. Also, medical professionals were 
responsible for implementing the Euthanasia Programme, which led to the “mass 
extermination of patients with ‘deficiencies’ or mental pathologies” (Lopez-Munoz, 796). 
This program was ultimately extended to include the extermination of those who 
constituted a threat to society, those with links to criminality, those who behaved 
antisocially, prostitutes, drifters and homosexuals. Finally, this practice of mass 
extermination served as the model for the “Final Solution,” which was executed to wipe 
out an enormous amount of Jewish victims. In addition to these overt methods of 
elimination, the German medical community played a large role in more covert 
procedures that took place in healthcare institutions. These included killing patients 
through malnutrition, turning off the heat in hospitals during the winter, and injecting 
patients with drugs in order to speed up the death process (Lopez-Munoz 797).  
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The most concerning manifestation of the connection between doctors and the 
Nazis was the use of human beings as research and laboratory subjects, not only among 
the atrocities of the death camps, but also in hospitals and universities. In addition to 
Jews gypsies, Slavs, homosexuals, and physically and mentally disabled persons were 
recruited as victims for these horrific experiments. Just as they justified carrying out the 
Sterilization Act and the Nuremberg Laws, by arguing that they were for the benefit of 
society, so too the medical personnel who carried out these activities justified them by 
arguing, “ if the sick have to die anyway, as a result of the expert assessment of one of 
my colleagues, why not make use of them while alive or after their execution for 
research” (Lopez-Munoz, 798)? 
Human experimentation performed by the Nazis extended to the field of 
neuropsychiatry. For example, they conducted research projects on various forms of 
mental retardation and epilepsy. These projects involved a long-term neuropsychological 
and physiological study and assessment of living patients, which culminated in the 
examination of the subjects’ brains after their death in accordance with the Euthanasia 
Programme. In addition, the Nazi doctors carried out experiments with electroshock 
techniques and drugs. For example, they performed brainwashing experiments, in which 
they administered chemical compounds to patients. From these examples it is clear that 
German doctors during this time neglected their duty as doctors and rejected the ethical 
principles intrinsic to the practice of their profession (Lopez-Munoz, 799). 
Like the Nazis, their Asian allies utilized a similar method. The Imperial Japanese 
Army developed a series of medical research units that conducted horrific experiments 
with human prisoners. Unit 731 was set up for bacteriological research using prisoners of 
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war, political detainees, and mentally ill and disabled Chinese subjects. They injected the 
subjects with various diseases, which subsequently caused the deaths of up to 10,000 
people (Lopez-Munoz, 799). Such practices also took place in other countries that had 
totalitarian regimes such as the former Soviet Union, China, and Chile. However, these 
methods were also used in democratic countries such as the United States, Great Britain, 
and Australia (Lopes-Munoz, 801).  
In the Soviet Union, institutional psychiatric abuse was not motivated by eugenics 
or “racial hygiene.” Rather, it was used as a weapon for removing various forms of 
dissension and unacceptable social behaviors. Despite differing motivations, the Soviet 
Union’s methods were similar to those of the Nazis. There was collaboration between the 
state psychiatric machinery and the police who tortured prisoners. Psychiatric abuse was 
extended to nationalists, potential emigrants, and those with religious beliefs. These 
people were confined to institutions that were considered “psychiatric prisons” after 
being falsely attributed with psychiatric disorders. In these institutions doctors used drugs 
for disciplinary purposes (Lopez-Munoz 801). The administration of psychotropic drugs 
to religious and political dissenters in totalitarian states was for the purpose of admitting 
patients to psychiatric institutions, as a disciplinary tool, as tactic to force the dissenters 
to denounce their anti-governmental ideas and activities, and as a form of torture (Lopez-
Munoz 801).  
Psychiatric and psychopharmacologic exploitation by government institutions has 
also taken place in non-totalitarian states. From the mid 1900’s, both the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the US Army performed various experiments with several 
chemical agents under the direction of leading psychiatrists. In addition to 
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experimentation of different groups, the CIA recruited prostitutes who would trick 
businessmen into visiting brothels. Once there, the men were covertly injected with LSD 
and their behavior was then observed. Also, they injected subjects with drugs for the 
purpose of attaining certain responses to guided interrogation. Many subjects died as a 
consequence of these experiments. It came out later that participants in these experiments 
“were exposed to serious danger of death or injury without their informed consent, 
without medical supervision and without the necessary monitoring to determine possible 
long term effects” (Lopez-Munoz, 802). In addition, prestigious healthcare and 
institutions and universities, as well as well-known neurosurgeons, psychologists, and 
psychiatrists worked with the Army and CIA on experiments for studying amnesiac states 
induced with psychoactive drugs.  
 
Review of Ethical Guidelines 
As a result of these horrors and the exploitation inherent in the use of prisoners as 
research subjects, ethical codes were written in an attempt to protect this population in 
addition to other populations classified as vulnerable, “a group of persons who, in virtue 
of some feature they share, such as limited cognitive abilities or unequal social 
circumstances, are deserving of special protection in research,” from being maltreated 
and exploited. The various codes of ethics that have been drawn up demonstrate that 
when vulnerable groups such as prisoners serve as research populations, special 
principles and a heightened degree of care must be employed to deal with them (Nickel, 
245). 
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As a reaction to the atrocities carried out by the Nazi doctors and scientists in the 
field of human research that were revealed during the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the 
Nuremberg code was published in August 1947. It is the first international code for 
research with human beings, and it is based on the Hippocratic oath of “first do no harm.” 
It was created to prevent any repetition of the calamity resulting from the extremely cruel 
attacks on human wellbeing and human rights. It put forth rules that should govern the 
use of human beings for experimentation. The need to obtain informed consent is 
emphasized, and it has since been regarded as the key issue of patients’ rights protection. 
The code consists of a declaration of ten principles, generally focusing on the protection 
of the rights of persons participating in medical research. It requires that in addition to the 
requirement for researchers and clinicians to protect their patients’ rights, the subjects 
themselves also actively participate in their own protection.  
The Nuremberg Code has not been formally implemented as a legal norm in any 
nation or medical association. However, it has had an extreme impact on the area of 
human rights and bioethics, since its fundamental requirement, informed consent, has 
been accepted all over the world, is preserved within several international laws regarding 
human rights, and is the foundation of the International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, published in 1982 (Lopez-Munoz 800).  
In 1964, the Eighteenth World Medical Assembly meeting in Helsinki adopted an 
ethical code to guide physicians and other investigators who conduct medical research 
involving human subjects. This code has been amended several times. The Declaration of 
Helsinki developed the ten principles first addressed in the Nuremberg Code and tied 
them to the Declaration of Geneva, a statement of a physician’s ethical duties. Thus, it 
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has many points in common with the Nuremberg code; most essential is the requirement 
for Informed Consent. However, they do have various differences. First, the Declaration 
of Helsinki points out that some, but not all medical, research is combined with medical 
care. Consequently, it puts forth, in addition to basic principles for all medical research, a 
set of principles for medical research combined with medical care or therapeutic research. 
Second, while the Nuremberg Code does not address research on subjects who are unable 
to provide informed consent, the Helsinki Code addresses such research, asserting the 
ethical acceptability under certain conditions of “proxy consent.” Despite the Declaration 
of Helsinki not being regarded as a binding instrument in international law, it is 
significant because it was the first significant effort of the medical community to regulate 
research itself, and forms the basis of subsequent ethical codes (Lopez-Munoz 803).   
In the 1970s, the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) was concerned that there 
were no specific texts requiring the use of ethical procedures in psychiatry. One issue that 
particularly made the psychiatric community aware of the problem and led to the 
composition of such a document was the political abuse and improper use of psychiatry 
and its applications in countries such as the former Soviet Union, Rumania and South 
Africa. Thus, in 1977 in Hawaii the WPA General Assembly adopted a Declaration of 
ethical principles, which was amended in 1983. The Declaration of Hawaii became the 
first document created by the psychiatric profession on ethical questions, and 
incorporated, in relation to human experimentation, the explicit requirement, for the first 
time, of obtaining informed consent before involving a patient in a research study 
(Lopez-Munoz, 802).  
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Prompted in part by problems arising from the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and 
protests taking place in the United States in support of the right to protection of 
participants in drug trials the Department of Health revised and expanded its regulations 
for the protection of human subjects. Due to the possible threat to civil rights and human 
values involved in the drug trials, in 1974 Congress appointed a commission called The 
National Commission for the Protection of Human subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral research. This was done in order to assure respect for the rights of subjects. 
This commission drafted The Belmont Report in 1978 in Baltimore. The report is not a 
set of regulations, but a framework for identifying, discussing, and settling ethical 
matters. This report stated that three basic ethical principles should direct all clinical 
pharmacological research with human beings and its applications. These are the principle 
of respect for persons and their autonomy, the principle of beneficence, and the principle 
of justice. Even though the Report ties the requirement to protect autonomy of persons 
with diminished capacity to the ethical principle of respect for persons, it addresses the 
concept of vulnerability in the framework of the principle of justice. This principle 
requires the distribution of the benefits and burdens of research. This code of ethics 
asserts that vulnerable groups may continually be sought out to participate in research 
because of their “ready availability in settings where research is conducted,” however, 
they should not shoulder unequal burdens in research. If they do take part in research, 
they require special protections because of their frequently compromised capacity for free 
consent and their dependent status (Levine, 45). The Belmont Report is an essential 
reference for institutional review boards that review research proposals of research 
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involving human subjects, in order to ensure that the research meets the ethical 
foundations and regulations (Lopez-Munoz, 802,803).  
In 1993, the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences put 
forward international ethical guidelines pertaining to research with human subjects. 
These guidelines, the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, which were originally 15 guidelines but after having been adapted in 
2002 are now 21, try to balance both protection from abuse in research and access to new, 
experimental treatments for the vulnerable (Ruof, 411). The recently revised CIOMS 
guidelines include a guideline pertaining to research involving vulnerable persons. It 
states that, “special justification is required for inviting vulnerable individuals to serve as 
research subjects, and, if they are selected, the means of protecting their rights and 
welfare must be strictly applied” (Macklin, 474). The most important characteristic that 
defines an individual as “vulnerable” is the “limited capacity or freedom to consent or to 
decline participation is research.” 
Federal Regulations to protect human subjects of research were established in 
1974 and adapted and codified in 1981. The regulations were revised in 1991 as the U.S-
Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects also known as the 
Common Rule. However, unlike other ethical guidelines it does not define vulnerability. 
Instead, it provides special protections for “particularly vulnerable populations.” These 
include pregnant women, human fetuses and neonates, prisoners, and children (Levine, 
45). These regulations define research as a “systematic investigation” designed to 
advance or add to “generalizable knowledge.” This includes research development, and 
testing and evaluation (York 55).  
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Subpart A of the Common Rule states two major requirements for all human 
subjects research. The first is that anyone participating in research that falls under the 
definition stated above must go through an informed consent process that includes a 
written consent that has eight required elements. The second is that all research studies 
must be reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board, a committee that has 
been formally designated to approve, monitor, and review biomedical and behavioral 
research involving humans with the aim to protect the rights and welfare of research 
subjects  (Chwang, 14). Subparts B, C, and D express further conditions for research with 
a variety of vulnerable populations: B is for pregnant women, fetuses and neonates, C is 
for prisoners, and D is for children. Subpart C, instructs that prisoner research must focus 
on possible causes, effects, and processes of incarceration, prisons as institutional 
structures or prisoners as incarcerated persons, conditions particularly affecting prisoners 
as a class, or practices that have the intent and reasonable probability of improving the 
health or well-being of research participants (Chwang, 15).  Under Subpart C, research 
must result in no more than minimal risk, which is defined as “the risk or harm normally 
encountered in their daily lives in their daily lives or in the routine medical, dental, or 
psychological examination of healthy persons” (Gostin, 737). 
 
Review of the Current Literature 
 Lawrence Gostin in his article entitled Biomedical Research Involving 
Prisoners discusses the ethical values and legal regulations regarding research studies 
that involve prisoners. He mentions that many companies including the US Army and 
major pharmaceutical companies performed a wide variety of research on prisoners up 
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until the early 1970s. This was due to their easy accessibility, vulnerability, and captivity. 
In many cases researchers did not obtain informed consent and failed to treat the 
prisoners properly for the pain they endured. Ultimately, in the mid 1970s research of this 
kind declined due to publicized knowledge of the exploitation of prisoners and the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research was created. Federal regulations that protected human subjects were 
adapted several times and came to be known as the Common Rule. This code of ethics 
applies to research funded by the department of Health and Human Services, to private 
institutions that assume a Federal-Wide Assurance of Compliance, and with exceptions, 
to 16 other Federal Agencies (737).  
The Common Rule contains requirements for institutional review board review, 
informed consent, and risk-benefit analysis. It also offers additional protections for 
vulnerable populations. Subpart C that refers to prisoners has not been taken on by many 
federal agencies because it is too restrictive. Part of subpart C stresses that research on 
prisoners can present no more than minimal risk, which means risk of harm normally 
encountered in their daily lives. However, this definition is very narrow and ambiguous. 
Thus, research subject to subpart C is frequently avoided. Since these restrictions pertain 
only to a few federal agencies and institutions that act in accordance with them through 
Federal-Wide Assurance Compliance, the bulk of research on prisoners is performed 
outside the statute of subpart C. “Federal oversight of research in prisons, therefore, is 
either too restrictive (effectively impeding responsible research) or inapplicable (opening 
the door to exploitation or abuse).”  Thus, the DHHS requested that the Institute of 
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Medicine consider the need for creating a new ethical framework for prisoner research 
and to identify regulatory safeguards (737).  
In recent years the amount of prisoners in correctional facilities has greatly 
increased. Thus, correctional facilities are overcrowded and many inmates are subject 
inadequate treatment including limited access to programs, services, and health care. In 
addition to their poor health and low socioeconomic status, prisoners are considered 
vulnerable due to their limited liberty and autonomy. They may not be capable of 
providing informed consent and may not have a practical expectation of privacy within 
prison settings. In this environment, prisoners may not be capable of meaningfully 
choosing between participating in research and not participating (738). 
A compromise between promoting beneficial research and protecting prisoners is 
difficult to achieve and it is politically controversial. The author suggests a few proposals 
that he believes solve this difficulty. Firstly, he suggests that the definition of prisoner be 
extended to include all individuals whose autonomy and liberty are limited by the justice 
system. Next, he recommends that all research on prisoners be regulated consistently, 
irrespective of the source of funding, supporting agency, or type of correctional facility. 
The third proposal is to create a national database for prisoner research. This would 
ensure greater accountability, provide a scientific method for measuring the success of 
research projects, and assist the implementation of beneficial research findings to 
prisoner populations. Another suggestion that the author makes is a shift from category-
based to a risk-benefit approach to research review. He argues that that categories of 
allowed research set up under subpart C do not offer reliable, consistent, or adequate 
safeguards for prisoner research. Thus, a risk-benefit approach that offers a range of 
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protections depending on the harshness of the correctional setting is a more sensible 
approach for guaranteeing that research involving prisoners will be ethical and safe. 
Under this guideline, research with prisoners as research subjects should be performed 
only if it presents a markedly favorable benefit-to-risk ratio and not due to the easy 
accessibility to prisoners or their lack of therapeutic treatment. In addition, the author 
proposes that the ethical framework be updated to include collaborative responsibility. If 
possible, everyone involved in the research, including the prisoners should take part in 
the design, planning, and implementation of the research. This would ensure that 
everyone involved would have a part in guaranteeing that the research is responsible.  
Finally, research should include enhanced systematic oversight. Protections beyond the 
variable review of the IRB should be strengthened, made consistent, and be applied to all 
degrees of risk and liberty constraints experienced by prisoners who are subjects in 
research (738, 739).  
In his article entitled Against Risk-Benefit Review of Prisoner Research, Eric 
Chwang discusses the some of the weaknesses of the Common Rule. He mentions the 
recommendations of the Institute of Medicine’s Ethical Considerations for Research 
Involving Prisoners. The suggested five changes to the current United States regulations 
on prisoner research. These are: to broaden the definition of “prisoner,” to guarantee 
universally and consistently applied standards of protection, to move from a category-
based to a risk-benefit approach to research review, to revise the ethical framework to 
include collaborative responsibility, and to improve systematic oversight of research 
involving prisoners (14). The IOM report maintains that the category-based constraints 
stated in the Common Rule are deficient since they are too subject to interpretation and 
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do not attend to actual prisoner vulnerabilities. Thus, the IOM report recommends that 
the category-based constraints be replaced with risk-benefit constraints. However, the 
author disagrees and thinks the Common Rule and IOM recommendations should be 
combined into an ethical framework. He suggests that additional risk-benefit restrictions 
on research are redundant and that the current Common Rule regulations excluding 
category-based constraints, but compounded with the IOM’s four other 
recommendations, guarantee that prisoner research is as ethical as non-prisoner research. 
Chwang argues that the reason for the IOM’s insistence on risk-benefit constraints is that 
the IOM compares the vulnerable population of prisoners to the vulnerable population of 
children, for whom research is regulated on the basis of risk-benefit restrictions. 
However, while children are not competent to give rational consent and rely on adults to 
determine whether or not they should serve as subjects in research, most prisoners are 
adults and can thus make rational decisions about participation in research (15).  
Chwang argues that even though the implementation of risk-benefit restrictions 
was designed to solve certain problems inherent to prisoners, there are several reasons 
why it was not successful in its attempt. First, risk-benefit constraints seem appropriate 
because they protect against the lack of autonomy inherent to prison life due to prisoner’s 
lack of freedom. They live in a coercive environment in which their lives are highly 
regulated, and therefore, it can be argued that prisoners cannot freely choose whether or 
not to participate in research. However, while it seems that prisoners living in a coercive 
are completely unfree meaning all of their decisions are made under “duress” then this is 
claim is false. Even though in this coercive environment many of prisoners’ decisions are 
subject to interference, this does not necessarily mean that every choice they make is 
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subject to coercive interference. Another argument is that even is prisoners can make 
some free choices the choice to participate in research will always be coerced. Yet, 
coercion is prohibited by Subpart A of the Common Rule, which applies to research with 
all populations. In addition, risk-benefit constraints do not alleviate these concerns about 
coercion since passing the research through a risk-benefit filter would not make it any 
more ethical to coerce prisoners into participating in research. The author suggests that 
the right response is to ensure that the research study is not coercive to begin with. The 
solution is not to add a risk-benefit analysis to the process; the solution is to make certain 
that the constraints already established for research are followed (17).  
In addition to risk-benefit analysis not being a suitable solution for the problem of 
coercion it is not a solution for the problem of undue inducement. Undue inducement is 
an inducement to participate in research that inappropriately influences the subject to 
enroll. Prisoner research seems susceptible to undue inducements; however, this concern 
is not resolved by additional risk-benefit constraints. Firstly, the IOM report is concerned 
with risk-benefit analysis because it wants to guarantee that the benefits of prisoner 
research are great enough to offset the risks. Yet, it does not mention the threat of undue 
inducement as a motivating factor for its suggestion of risk-benefit restrictions. Also, 
undue inducements are no more problematic for prisoners than they are for the general 
population and the Common Rule already prohibits undue inducement. Therefore, it is 
essential that the constraints already in place are strictly followed, not the addition of new 
constraints (18).  
Finally, while additional risk-benefit restrictions might seem to help solve the 
issue of exploitation of prisoners they in fact do not. This is partly due to the fact that 
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calculating the degree of exploitation is controversial. In order to eliminate exploitation, 
we would have to figure out not just whether the benefits of participation outweigh the 
risks. Rather, we would also have to figure out whether the net benefits are sufficiently 
high. This may depend on comparing those benefits to the benefits to the researcher and 
to society. We would therefore require an expected benefit calculation. This idea, that we 
must guarantee that the allocation of benefits is not exploitative is not part of the IOM 
report’s suggestion. Even if they did incorporate this calculation, it would still be 
problematic because the calculation can yield incorrect results. In addition, exploitation is 
a problem for all research not just for research involving prisoners. Exploitation should 
be prohibited and more rigorous guidelines should be implemented for all research. Thus, 
we do not need additional restrictions for prisoner research. What is needed is better 
supervision to guarantee that more general constraints, which apply to all research, are 
followed (20).  
David Thomas in his article entitled Prisoner Research- Looking Back or Looking 
Forward discusses the issue of what he calls “prisoner’s right to research”, which refers 
to the concept of a prisoner’s right to participate in medical research as a subject. The 
author argues that this issue has been rarely addressed. While the IOM recommendations 
advocates for prisoners and allows research on prisoners it does not advocate for the 
concept of a prisoner’s right to research (23).  There are a variety of therapies in current 
medical care that change with great rapidity. Unlike a non-incarcerated person who could 
readily access therapies and receive treatment if needed, in a prison environment the only 
way to gain access to these therapies is to participate in a clinical trial. Thus, refusing 
prisoners the advantages of modern therapies would be equivalent to restricting their 
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rights due only to their incarceration. Courts have commonly held that the punishment is 
imprisonment. Forms of imprisonment that extend beyond humane confinement may 
defy the 8th Amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, denying 
incarcerated persons therapy by virtue of their incarceration creates an unequal state of 
affairs that imposes upon the essential issue of justice as articulated in the Belmont 
Report (25). Research involving prisoners with suitable protections that gives prisoners 
the accepted standard of care, should not be denied (26).  
In addition to the IOM recommendations, Julio Arboleda-Florez, in his article The 
Ethics of Biomedical Research on Prisoners suggests other rules to ensure the protection 
of prisoners involved in research. First he recommends that external rewards should not 
be used as inducements to participate in research. Medical care, healthy food, reduction 
in sentence, or an increase in visiting hours should not be used to persuade prisoners to be 
involved in research. Next he suggests that therapeutic research should be distinguished 
from nontherapeutic research. This is necessary so that prisoners will not be denied 
eventual health benefits that could result from involvement as a subject in research. In 
addition the author insists that the Institutional Review Board must have a role (516). 
Finally, he proposes that increased external governance should be introduced. This is due 
to the trouble that results from lack of oversight. Efficient means for the supervising and 
monitoring of continuing projects must be implemented by prison administrators in 
cooperation with external agencies (517).   
Carol Levine et al. in The Limitations of “Vulnerability” as a Protection for 
Human Research Participants addresses the concept of vulnerability in a different way 
from the authors previously mentioned in this paper. She discusses the limitations of 
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classifying a person or group as vulnerable. The concept of vulnerability has three major 
problems. First, so many categories of people are now considered vulnerable that 
practically all possible human subject are included. If everyone is vulnerable then the 
concept becomes too tenuous to be significant. Apparently, the purpose of labeling a 
group as vulnerable is to give additional protections above those required for all human 
participants. As more and more groups come to be designated “vulnerable,” the 
consequence is that every research protocol requires some type of special attention and 
the IRB has no guidance on where to focus their limited attention and resources. The 
second problem is that “if the concept of vulnerability is too broad, it is also too narrow. 
An almost sole emphasis on group characteristics that presumably undercut or eliminate 
the capacity to give consent can deflect attention from aspects of the research itself, the 
environment, or the social and economic context that can put participants in harms way. 
While consent is in fact an important concern, the root of the concept of vulnerability lies 
in the risk of physical harm (46). Finally, labeling groups and individuals as vulnerable 
stereotypes whole categories of individuals without differentiating between individuals in 
the group who actually might have special characteristics that need to be taken into 
consideration and those who do not. Furthermore, some individuals may be vulnerable in 
some circumstances and not in others. Thus, a person’s needs for particular protections in 
the research context depend not only on that individual’s inclusion in a group, but also on 
the specific characteristics of the research project and the environment in which it is 
taking place (47) 
In the article entitles Protecting Prisoners from Harmful Research: Is “Being 
Heard” Enough? Mobley et al. questions the recommendations of the IOM despite the 
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improvements that they have made on prisoner protection in research. In this article the 
author specifically addresses the IOM recommendation that refers to the role of the 
prisoners in the process of their own protection. He questions “whether having a formal 
position, as a prisoner representative, regardless of the institutionally prescribed role in 
the process, is effective as a means of protection from exploitation, harm, or elevated risk 
for harm.” This proposal, even though a major improvement over their exclusion, may 
function to include the “symbolic” voice of prisoners, but to exclude the “content” of 
their valuable contribution. This is due to the concern that prisoners’ empirical 
knowledge will be overlooked relative to the professionals’ opinions. Thus, the research 
collaboration process is unreliable. Without a way to include prisoners’ voices into the 
actual research process, such that the result is significantly shaped by his or her 
contribution, all efforts to include the human subject’s voice may be negated (43).  
 
Ethical Analysis 
As can be seen from the literature previously discussed, there has been an ongoing 
debate regarding the ethical issues surrounding the use of prisoners as subjects of 
research studies, and the proper course of action to take in order to ensure prisoners’ 
protection from exploitation and coercion while at the same time maintaining their 
autonomy.  According to the various codes of ethics the requirement to protect the 
autonomy of persons with diminished capacity, such as the vulnerable population of 
prisoners is linked to the ethical principle of respect for persons. Also, various codes of 
ethics address the concept of vulnerability within the framework of the principle of 
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justice. Finally, the most commonly offered justification for human research is Utilitarian 
in nature. 
According to the principle of respect for persons an individual should be treated 
as an autonomous agent and a person with diminished autonomy is entitled to protection. 
In prison environments, the constraints on prisoners’ voluntariness, and concerns about 
whether they are truly free to make informed consent decisions about participation in 
research projects lead them to be labeled as “vulnerable.” Inmates have diminished 
liberty and autonomy, and in the prison environment there are poor quality health care 
systems and thus, prisoners may be subject to coercion and may volunteer to participate 
in research simply to gain access to basic medical care. Also, it is common for inmates to 
have their participation as research subjects bought by means of small, but in the prison 
environment significant rewards such as food, or better sleeping conditions. And even in 
some cases substantial rewards such as reduced sentence, improved healthcare, or large 
payments.  In addition, they might not receive effective treatment for harms that result 
from the research study.  Therefore, many argue that research studies should be restricted 
from prison environments. However, despite the risks, research studies can also confer 
many benefits to inmates. Certain research might be able to improve the health of 
prisoners and their living conditions. In addition, prisoners can benefit from research in 
the altruistic sense of finding purpose and satisfaction in their contribution to a greater 
good and a sense that they are still regarded as useful and contributing members of 
society. Another argument against the restriction of research in prison settings due to 
reduced autonomy is that some (like Chwang) argue that even though inmates have 
diminished autonomy in terms of restricted liberty or freedom, they are still adults who 
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can make rational decisions. In addition, their diminished range of daily choices that is 
inherent to prison life does not necessarily denote that they are incapable of making all 
decisions and does not mean that all of prisoners’ decisions are coerced.   
In addition to the safeguarding prisoners as individuals with limited autonomy 
and liberty, ethical guidelines stress the protection of prisoners along the lines of the 
principle of justice. This ethical principle calls for distributing the benefits and burdens of 
research. Vulnerable populations, such as prisoners may continually be sought as 
research subjects because of their easy accessibility, which as mentioned previously has 
frequently occurred in distant and recent history. In addition, incarcerated persons are 
often specifically denied access to cutting edge therapies by virtue of their incarceration 
increasing the gap between the haves and have-nots. This creates an unequal situation 
that impinges upon the fundamental issue as articulated in the Belmont Report. Various 
ethical guidelines therefore emphasize that prisoners should not bear disproportionate 
burdens in research. If they do participate, they require special protections. The IOM 
recommended particularly strict protections such as research should be limited to phase 3 
trials that offer potential benefits to the research participants and not simply to prisoners 
as a class or the public at large. Further, the ratio of prisoner to non-prisoner research 
participants should not exceed 50% to guarantee a fair distribution of research burdens.  
Also, the IOM recommends the use of risk-benefit analysis to ensure that the benefits of 
the study outweigh the risks. However, the use of additional risk-benefit constraints to 
protect prisoners from harm such as coercion and exploitation are in fact treating 
mentally competent adults as if they were children incapable of making rational 
decisions. As Chwang points out, the only way for risk benefit constraints to eliminate 
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the exploitation of prisoners and from the harms that could be conferred from bearing the 
burden of research, the benefits to the inmates must be significantly high enough to 
exceed the risks they are subject to as societal benefits increase. If society stands to gain a 
great deal, then subjects must all benefit to a greater degree, in order to prevent the 
exploitation of prisoners for that societal gain. In addition, under one or another of the 
ethical guidelines, nearly everyone may be considered “vulnerable” and deserving of 
special protections, especially since the benefits of research can never be guaranteed in 
advance. In this case, the concept of vulnerability becomes too vague to be meaningful. 
Along the same lines, not all member of a group are necessarily vulnerable and thus, the 
protections that would exclude them from the harms or benefits of research would be 
inaccurately applied.  
Finally, a justification for the use of human beings as research subjects stems 
from the ethical theory of Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism’s principle of utility articulates 
that one should choose those actions that will yield the greatest amount of benefit to the 
most people. According to this theory an individual’s rights may be infringed upon in 
order to benefit the greater population. In this case, the theory of utilitarianism does not 
seem to require the use of informed consent as other ethical principles do. If more good 
will come of forcing, coercing, or exploiting individuals to participate as subjects in a 
research study, according to this principle it is legitimate and justified. The utilitarian 
conclusion is that research on human beings is not only permissible, but also morally 
required to benefit the common good. It argues that the future benefits and prevention of 
harm to many that result from human experimentation will far outweigh the potential 
harmful consequences to research subjects. However, it is this mentality, the sacrifice of 
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the few for the good of the many that led to the atrocities of the Holocaust and the horrors 
committed to other prisoners and vulnerable individuals. It is the reason for the 
development of ethical guidelines to protect such groups from being exploited for the 
benefit of the greater population.  
 
Position Statement 
Based on the ethical arguments mentioned previously in this paper, I believe that 
prisoners should not be restricted from participating in research studies based on their 
designation as a “vulnerable population.” Regarding the IOM’s proposal for additional 
risk benefit constraints due to prisoners supposed lack of capacity to supply informed 
consent to research, I think it is wrong to assume that prisoners need similar constraints to 
those of children. Adults must protect children by determining what is in their best 
interest. Prisoners on the other hand, are adults (aside from minors or those who are 
mentally incompetent, who would require additional constraints) and can make their own 
rational decisions, in this case particularly regarding whether or not to participate in 
research. I agree with Chwang’s argument that the additional constraints suggested by the 
IOM committee do not address the problems that prisoners face more frequently than 
non-prisoners do, such as coercion, undue inducement, and exploitation. However, I do 
think that research on human beings in general does need specific safeguards. Therefore, 
there is no need for additional risk-benefit constraints on prisoner research. Rather, better 
oversight is needed to guarantee that the appropriate constraints on all research are 
followed even when the subjects are prisoners. Excluding prisoners from research based 
on the history of exploitation of this population would leave prisoners without the 
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benefits of modern science that could improve the quality of their lives and the conditions 
of the prison environment. With proper and efficient oversight, respect for human beings 
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